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Abstract. By American standards, New Orleans is a very
old, very popular city in the southern part of the United
States. It is located in Louisiana at the mouth of the Mis-
sissippi River, a river which drains about 40% of the Conti-
nental United States, making New Orleans a major port city.
It is also located in an area of major oil reserves onshore, as
well as offshore, in the Gulf of Mexico. Most people know
New Orleans as a tourist hotspot; especially well-known is
the Mardi Gras season at the beginning of Lent. People re-
fer to the city as the “Big Easy”. A recent biography of the
city refers to it as the place where the emergence of modern
tourism began. A multicultural city with a heavy French in-
fluence, it was part of the Louisiana Purchase from France in
early 1803, when the United States bought it, doubling the
size of the United States at that time.
Today, in the year 2007, New Orleans is now known for
the devastating impacts it withstood during the onslaught of
Hurricane Katrina in late August 2005. Eighty percent of the
city was submerged under flood waters. Almost two years
have passed, and many individuals and government agencies
are still coping with the hurricane’s consequences. And in-
surance companies have been withdrawing their coverage for
the region.
The 2005 hurricane season set a record, in the sense that
there were 28 named storms that calendar year. For the first
time in hurricane forecast history, hurricane forecasters had
to resort to the use of Greek letters to name tropical storms
in the Atlantic and Gulf (Fig. 1).
Hurricane Katrina was a Category 5 hurricane when it was
in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico, after having passed
across southern Florida. At landfall, Katrina’s winds de-
creased in speed and it was relabeled as a Category 4. It de-
volved into a Category 3 hurricane as it passed inland when
it did most of its damage. Large expanses of the city were
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inundated, many parts under water on the order of 20 feet
or so. The Ninth Ward, heavily populated by African Amer-
icans, was the site of major destruction, along with several
locations along the Gulf coasts of the states of Mississippi
and Alabama, as well as other parts of Louisiana coastal ar-
eas (Brinkley, 2006).
The number of deaths officially attributed to Hurricane
Katrina was on the order of 1800 to 2000 people. The cost
of the hurricane in terms of physical damage has been esti-
mated at about US$250 billion, the costliest natural disaster
in American history. It far surpassed the cost of Hurricane
Andrew in 1992, the impacts of which were estimated to be
about $20 billion. It also surpassed the drought in the US
Midwest in 1988, which was estimated to have cost the coun-
try $40 billion, but no lives were lost.
Some people have referred to Katrina as a “superstorm”.
It was truly a superstorm in terms of the damage it caused
and the havoc it caused long after the hurricane’s winds and
rains had subsided. The effects of Katrina are sure to be re-
membered for generations to come, as were the societal and
environmental impacts of the severe droughts and Dust Bowl
days of the 1930s in the US Great Plains.
It is highly likely that the metropolitan area of New Or-
leans which people had come to know in the last half of the
20th century will no longer exist, and a new city will likely
replace it (one with a different culture). Given the likelihood
of sea level rise on the order of tens of centimeters associated
with the human-induced global warming of the atmosphere,
many people wonder whether New Orleans will be able to
survive throughout the 21st century without being plagued
by several more tropical storms (Gill, 2005). Some (e.g.,
Speaker of the US House of Representatives Hastert) have
even questioned whether the city should be restored in light
of the potential impacts of global warming and the city’s ge-
ographic vulnerability to tropical storms.
Published by Copernicus Publications on behalf of the European Geosciences Union.
288 M. H. Glantz: Hurricane Katrina as a “teachable moment”
Figure 1. Annual number of named storms and 
Fig. 1. Annual number of named storms and major hurricanes.
Source: NOAA.
1 Teachable moments about science
Hurricane Katrina can serve as an instructive case study of
the multifaceted impacts of a natural hazard on a mega-urban
setting. As such, it provides students of disasters a “teachable
moment”, meaning that there are many lessons to be identi-
fied by reviewing Hurricane Katrina: the forecast of it, the
social responses to the forecast and to Katrina’s physical im-
pacts and to differentiated impacts on poor and rich, white
and black, and of course the politics of a so-called natural
disaster. I have chosen to highlight six teachable moments
that are briefly discussed in the paper. The list is as follows:
1. There are limitations on the value to society of a hurri-
cane (or any meteorological) forecast.
In theory, a perfect forecast several days in advance of
a hurricane can be of infinite value to the at-risk so-
ciety. However, in reality such a perfect forecast is
of little value if it is not used to move people out of
harm’s way. Such movement will depend on a society’s
decision-making capabilities (timeliness, effectiveness)
in the face of an impending threat from a natural hazard.
2. A disaster’s direct and indirect impacts result from a
mix of natural and societal factors.
It was only a few decades ago that natural hazards such
as droughts, floods, fires and even infectious disease
outbreaks were blamed on any one or a combination of
climate’s various characteristics: precipitation, temper-
ature, relative humidity, cloud cover and variation in the
lengths, and therefore expected flow, of the seasons. Re-
search in the mid-1970s and thereafter has shown that
a natural hazard’s impacts have been worsened by de-
cisions made by policy makers as well as individuals
(Glantz, 2001).
3. An early warning by itself does not constitute an early
warning system.
An early warning alone in the form of a forecast is not
sufficient to ward off a potential disaster. It is only an
early stage in the warning system process, which then
involves translating the forecast into usable language
for the public, widespread and timely dissemination of
the forecast to those at risk as well as those responsi-
ble for those at-risk communities, disaster preparedness
and even post-disaster reconstruction activities (Glantz,
2007).
4. Superstorms come in all sizes.
Since the early 1990s, there has been an increase in
the use of the adjective “super” with regard to meteo-
rological and hydrological anomalies. A storm could
be super because of its record-setting physical parame-
ters, because of the level of damage it causes, because of
the number of deaths and injuries, or because someone
thoughtlessly labeled the anomaly as having been a su-
perstorm. A definition of superstorm is needed (Glantz,
2004).
5. Katrina has educational value for use by decision mak-
ers as an analogue for risks faced by low-lying coastal
urban areas worldwide.
Most likely, all low-lying coastal urban areas have taken
notice of the plight of New Orleans and the rest of the
US Gulf coast via the electronic and print media. They
had to do so, because they may face similar fates in
the future given a global warming of the atmosphere:
sea level rise, storm surges, changing storm tracks, and
changes in storm intensity and frequency. A Katrina
case study can be used to “forecast by analogy” the pos-
sible impacts that other low-lying coastal cities might
have to face with global warming.
6. There are limitations on the use, and therefore value, of
scenarios.
As will be seen below, having a perfect scenario in hand
(e.g., the scenario for Hurricane Pam) in no way en-
sures that proper and timely responses will be under-
taken when a similar (but real) hurricane has been fore-
cast.
2 Teachable moments about society
There are also teachable moments about the societal aspects
of Hurricane Katrina or, for that matter, any extreme climate,
water or weather event. Several of the following statements
have actually been made in one context or another related to
Katrina. I consider these statements to be either misconcep-
tions or myths. Each of these statements, which some peo-
ple might accept as valid or as partial truths, demand close
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scrutiny, evaluation and discussion and, where appropriate,
rejection. They are as follows:
1. Poor people choose to live in dangerous places.
It is quite clear that poor people do not choose to live
in at-risk locations. If they had the financial means to
avoid it, they would do so. They are often the victims of
circumstances beyond their control.
2. Technology is the answer.
Technology may be an answer to climate, water or
weather related problems, but one must ask, “What
was the question for which technology is the answer?”
Even with an excellent forecast sixty hours in advance
of landfall, the magnitude of death and destruction for
Hurricane Katrina was of major proportions.
3. People “learn” from their mistakes.
This is really an expression of wishful thinking. Some-
times people learn from their mistakes as well as from
their successes, but sometimes they don’t. That soci-
eties, groups, or individuals learn from their mistakes
must not be accepted as a universal truth. Whether soci-
eties do learn will depend, to a large extent, on the con-
text surrounding (in this case) the forecast of the natural
hazard, the ensuing disaster, and societal and govern-
mental responses to it.
4. Global warming has nothing to do with today’s (2007)
disasters.
While scientists are not yet in a position to blame any
single event on global warming, there is mounting evi-
dence that increases in sea surface temperatures would
fuel the intensity of hurricanes. While a definitive state-
ment cannot yet be made affirming that a warmer atmo-
sphere will increase hurricane intensity (though it seems
logical), definitive statements refuting such a correla-
tion can also not be made.
5. The Third World is more vulnerable to hazards than are
industrialized countries.
This statement is repeated in the IPCC reports and is
apparently accepted by the research community as if it
were beyond question and without exception (Agarwal
and Narain, 1998). However, the statement and belief
must be reviewed for its correctness. I believe that there
are sure to be instances where industrialized countries
could suffer global warming impacts as much as devel-
oping countries. For example, Hurricane Katrina ex-
posed the failure of the US Government’s ability to re-
spond to a climate-related crisis.
6. The impacts associated with Hurricane Katrina were the
result of a “natural” disaster.
While various government 
agencies responsible for 
responding to disaster situations 
as well as fo
would like to blam
death and destruction, society 
can usually be shown to have 
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Jackson, 2006). Figure 2. Was Katrina’s path “foreseeable”? From website at 
http://globalsecurity.org/   Fig. 2. Was Katrina’s path “foreseeable”?
From website at http://globalsecurity.org/.
While various government agencies responsible for re-
sponding to disaster situations as well as forecasts of
them would like to blame Nature for death and destruc-
tion, society can usually be shown to have been impli-
cated in the severity of the impacts. Decisions about
land use planning, housing developments, land clear-
ing, wetland drainage and levee maintenance can make
a society more or less vulnerable by increasing or de-
creasing its exposure to hazards (e.g., Jackson, 2006).
3 Was Katrina’s path or its devastating impacts foresee-
able?
The concept of “foreseeability” is borrowed from the law
(Gifis, 1991). I view it as a qualitative expression of prob-
ability. For example, if I choose to drive a car in a city that
I have never visited before and I decide to run through a red
light, I would have no idea of the probability for being hit by
a car coming from another direction. I do not have the statis-
tics for the traffic at that particular cross-section. However,
a person of sound mind would realize that it was highly pos-
sible that a car would be coming through the cross-section
at the same time. That is why there are red lights at that
particular corner to manage traffic. Foreseeability attributes
responsibility or culpability. That means that running the red
light would be my fault and that I would be responsible for
any damages that might occur (Glantz and Cullen, 2003).
This graphic (Fig. 2) shows several hurricane near-misses
of New Orleans that have occurred in recent decades. Many
articles have appeared during the past two decades in local
newspapers (e.g., Times-Picayune) as well as in the national
news about the vulnerability of the Gulf Coast to tropical
storms. New Orleans has been especially vulnerable, since
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evacuation. 
 
Figure 3. From National Hurricane Center, 26 August 2005 
Fig. 3. From National Hurricane Center, 26 August 2005.
much of it is below sea level and is protected from flooding
by levees. It has been well known for a few decades that the
levees were in need of repair. Hurricane Georges in 1998
almost hit New Orleans, but at the last moment it veered to
the right of the city.
Hurricane Georges did in fact serve as a wake-up call to
those federal, state and local agencies responsible for pro-
tecting the city from floods and impacts of tropical storms.
All observers accepted the irrefutable fact that the levees had
to be repaired. Five years of funding were then authorized by
the Congress toward the reparation of levees. Reconstruction
began in 2000 and continued until 2003, when funds were
diverted away from levee repair to the US war effort in Iraq.
Volunteers were left to do their best to continue to work on
shoring up the levees. Funds were sorely needed but were
unavailable.
One can effectively argue that a Category 3 hurricane
would eventually make landfall at or near the New Orleans
metropolitan area. Government planners from local to na-
tional levels should have foreseen the impacts associated
with a hurricane making landfall at or near New Orleans.
This observation is not rocket science. It is just common
sense to expect landfall, something that seemed to have been
missing in the years leading up to August 29, 2005, when Ka-
trina made landfall. Hurricane Pam, discussed below, was a
belated recognition of the need to consider a worst-case sce-
nario for impacts of a hurricane striking New Orleans head-
on.
 
Figure 4. This image was taken by NOAA’s Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite o
GOES. Credit: NOAA.Fig. 4. This image was taken by NOAA’s Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellite or GOES. Credit: NOAA.
4 Hurricane Katrina
4.1 The forecast on 26 August 2005
This particular graphic (Fig. 3) includes the cone of uncer-
tainty surrounding the projected trajectory of Hurricane Ka-
trina. Note that the trajectory provided on that date depicted
a direct hit on New Orleans. The cone of uncertainty shows
that the hurricane could have veered to the right or to the left.
It did neither.
After this forecast was issued, the director of the US Na-
tional Hurricane Center suggested on 27 August to the mayor
of New Orleans that a mandatory evacuation be undertaken.
The mayor, however, chose to call for a voluntary evacuation
at that time (Brookings Institution, 2006). On the morning of
28 August, Mayor Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation.
4.2 After the landfall: post 29 August 2005
This satellite image (Fig. 4) shows that the projected trajec-
tory proved to be the actual path taken by this hurricane. One
can also see that the hurricane was several hundred kilome-
ters in diameter. It is important to note that, however at-
tractive this satellite image might be, under those expansive
white clouds are death and destruction in coastal Louisiana,
Mississippi and Alabama. Under those clouds are homes,
streets, neighborhoods, shops, postal zones and communities
under water. Under those clouds are uprooted lives, repre-
sented by the fact that more than one million people evacu-
ated the region for safer ground. The headline of New Or-
leans’ newspaper, the Times-Picayune, stated “Katrina: the
storm we always feared.”
The responses to the updated forecasts from a few days
in advance until landfall included, but were not limited to,
the following: those who had access to cars fled the city,
clogging highways for these few days. However, not every-
one had access to a car. Many victims chose to stay in their
homes, having neither a place to go nor money to get there,
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Fig. 5. Breach in 17th St. Canal in New Orleans, LA, 31 August
2005. Credit: NOAA.
if they did find a place to go. Another possible considera-
tion by some who chose not to leave the at-risk coastal areas
is that there had been false alarms and calls for evacuations
when past hurricanes failed to make landfall. To some Kat-
rina victims, their assumption might have been that this was
just another hurricane forecast with a low probability of ac-
tually hitting New Orleans.
Once Katrina made landfall, those who remained trapped
inside the city eventually had to seek refuge wherever they
could. An estimated 25 000 refugees ended up living for
several days in the Louisiana Superdome, with no ameni-
ties such as toilet paper, soap, diapers, clean clothes, wash
facilities and a scarcity of bottled water. Rumors seem to
rule media coverage. There were unsubstantiated but broad-
casted rumors of people firing guns at rescue helicopters, for
example, and allegations of rape occurring in the Superdome.
There was considerable finger-pointing by politicians and bu-
reaucrats trying to avoid blame for the ineffective response
to the impacts of the hurricane. Frustrated newspersons on
TV lost their composure and neutral commentary in favor of
blaming the government for its poor response time and inad-
equate assistance to disaster victims.
 
 
Figure 6: Composite of refugees from Hurricanes Mitch and Katrina (public domain images prepared by
CCB) 
Fig. 6. Composite of refugees from Hurricanes Mitch and Katrina
(public domain images prepared by CCB).
5 So what happened?
With regard to the physical impacts of Hurricane Katrina,
four levees were topped by the waters of Lake Pontchartrain
or collapsed (Fig. 5). Eighty percent of New Orleans was
flooded, and the poorer African-American parts of the city
suffered heavily. As noted earlier, Mississippi and Alabama
coastlines, as well as southern Florida, were affected by Ka-
trina, though New Orleans captured most of the media’s at-
tention. One million people fled New Orleans by the night
of 28 August. Mandatory evacuation was called for on 29
August and, as noted earlier, an estimated 25 000 refugees
found their way to the Superdome.
The societal impacts in New Orleans as well as in other
affected parts of the Gulf Coast of Mississippi and Alabama
and parts of were captured in photos and videos. People
were caught on film wading through chest-high water, seek-
ing essentials in flooded shops or transporting family mem-
bers, neighbors and possessions atop anything that would
float (Fig. 6). The pictures showed to the rest of America,
as well as to the world, the level of destruction of infrastruc-
ture and the depth of despair of those affected by Katrina.
Americans everywhere rose to the occasion by sending cash
donations as well as food, clothing and other essentials to the
victims. They collectively held their breath over the plight
of their fellow citizens, regardless of race, creed or religion.
A demographic review showed that the victims were in large
measure African-American: living in rental housing, dispro-
portionately below the poverty line and, relative to other re-
gions, unemployed (Logan, 2006).
Katrina evacuees fled to the following locations: about
40% to other parts of Louisiana, and about 30% to other parts
of Mississippi. Texas, especially Houston, received about
12%; Alabama 8%, and so forth. These numbers are based
on applications for federal assistance that had been received
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Houston, Texas, took in the largest number of evacuees
who fled Louisiana. The city’s government and inhabitants
opened their doors to the refugees. Within a year, however,
the city wanted Katrina evacuees to return home. A report in
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a Newsweek article (Campo-Flores, 2006) stated, “Crime is
up. Schools are overcrowded. Hospitals are jammed. Hous-
ton welcomed a flood of hurricane evacuees with open arms.
But now the city is suffering from a case of ‘compassion fa-
tigue’.”
The photographs of Katrina’s impacts that captured the im-
pacts on affected populations were quite reminiscent of the
impacts of Central America’s Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Con-
siderable damage was recorded to infrastructure (transporta-
tion, electrification and communication), and an estimated
17 000 deaths were associated with Hurricane Mitch. In fact,
when Mitch did most of its damage to Honduras, it was no
longer a Category 5 hurricane; it had devolved into a very
slow-moving tropical depression. There were many photos
at the time of victims in Honduras, Nicaragua and El Sal-
vador. To be sure, Americans never expected to see similar
photos of American refugees on American soil.
A cursory search on the Internet will find many political
headlines about Hurricane Katrina, such as: “Poll: One in
three say poor federal response to Katrina hurt race rela-
tions”; “Katrina, Miss governance, etc.”; “A year later, too
little progress”; “Chertoff vows to ‘re-engineer’ prepared-
ness”; “Dying for a home: toxic trailers are making Kat-
rina refugees ill”; “Katrina victims not on Bush’s agenda”;
“FEMA’s ‘Pam’ simulation foretold Katrina disaster”; “Dry
run for Katrina”; and “They knew what to expect.”
Scores of cartoons also appeared, focusing on government
responses (or lack thereof) to the impacts on Gulf Coast vic-
tims as well as to the needs of the refugees. For example,
several photos taken during flood stages show people sitting
on rooftops throughout the flooded parts of the city, waiting
to be rescued by the government, any government. In fact,
several offers of assistance in cash and in kind poured in from
countries around the globe, most of which were not accepted
(Solomon and Hsu, 2007). One particular photo that caught
my attention was of a young man in his twenties with his dog
sitting on the rooftop of his house, which was submerged,
for the most part, under about 20 feet of water. In a cartoon
specifically designed to point a finger of blame at President
Bush and his administration’s abysmal response to the plight
of Katrina victims, one sees a caricature of President Bush
seated on the roof of the White House holding up a sign for
helicopter rescuers to see that read, “Come and git me now.”
6 Lessons identified
After every disaster, lessons are identified and recommenda-
tions are always made with the hope that similar hazards in
the future will not produce the same level of adverse societal,
if not physical, impacts. In this regard, Hurricane Katrina
was no different than previous disasters. Many lessons have
been identified by a wide range of observers as a result of Ka-
trina’s occurrence. Yet, a review of retrospective impact as-
sessments undertaken in the past few decades clearly shows
that many of the so-called “lessons learned” and recommen-
dations made were in fact not pursued. Most likely what hap-
pens is that good intentions are constrained by newly emerg-
ing problems and crises that continually arise to confront po-
litical leaders and societies. As time passes following a dis-
aster, interest in the disaster and sympathy for the victims
tend to wane. This is what American political scientist An-
thony Downs referred to as the “issue-attention cycle”: in a
short period of time, the public becomes tired of focusing on
a specific issue and begins to identify with other issues about
which to be concerned (Downs, 1972).
Some years ago, I edited a book entitled, Once Burned,
Twice Shy: Lessons from the 1997–98 El Nin˜o (Glantz,
2001). Since then, however, I have come to believe that
what people tend to do following a disaster is to identify
lessons but not really learn them. While some of the post-
disaster recommendations might be pursued, suggesting that
lessons had been learned, most lessons are often not imple-
mented. I now think that the phrase “lessons learned” is part
of the problem. By this I mean that the public is led by this
phrase to believe that, because lessons have been labeled as
learned, they are being used as a guide to the implement-
ing of corrective measures. People are led to believe that
an unspecified entity – the government, humanitarian orga-
nizations, humanitarian aid agencies of government, citizen
groups – is busy applying the lessons that had been identified.
However, often this is not the case. It seems that the impor-
tant chain of events from hazard to disaster to lessons iden-
tified to lessons learned is broken in that last link. A web-
based search for articles, reports and commentary highlight-
ing “lessons learned” from Katrina yields scores of items.
7 The Hurricane Pam scenario: where real life imitated
art
In July 2004, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) organized a conference of local and federal gov-
ernment officials to discuss an impacts scenario about a hy-
pothetical Category 3 Hurricane Pam striking New Orleans
head on (LSU, 2004). The hypothetical forecast was pro-
vided to participants as a perfect forecast to which they and
their agencies had to respond. They were asked to respond to
expected impacts as well as to the forecast. The scenario for
Pam included 20 inches of rainfall, 120-mph winds, and one
million evacuees. It was stated as part of the scenario that
“as many as 100 000 people lived in households in which no
one owned a car.” On the order of 250 participants discussed
ways to respond to the impacts such an event.
Participants were also asked to develop emergency and re-
covery plans for New Orleans.
They were told that there would be about 100 000 deaths
and many injured, requiring the need for field hospitals to
be set up for victims in the flood zone. It was also rec-
ognized that there would be considerable debris that would
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have to be disposed of and that new landfills would have
to be designated. A press conference was held at the end
of the exercise, providing the media with a positive view of
the preparedness of various government agencies to work to-
gether in the event of such a hypothetical disaster (FEMA,
2004). Follow-on Hurricane Pam workshops were conducted
in November/December 2004, July 2005, and August 2005.
As it turned out, little in the way of coordination took place
in the flood zone for several days after Hurricane Katrina
made landfall. Those who had not been evacuated were, for
the most part, left on their own, while local to federal agen-
cies tried to get their collective act together. At the time,
there was considerable finger-pointing among various local
and federal agencies, about who was to have been the first
responder, or about who did or did not ask for assistance,
and when it was finally requested.
The fact that such a scenario had been played out only one
year before New Orleans was tested by an actual hurricane,
and the fact that little learning had apparently taken place
as a result of the Hurricane Pam scenario, suggest that such
worst-case scenarios may have a very short shelf life thereby
making them of very limited practical value, even though in
theory they may be extremely valuable as heuristic devices.
8 Concluding thoughts
The Hurricane Katrina case study is enough to make any per-
son scratch his or her head in wonderment. How could such
a highly industrialized country, the self-proclaimed “leader
of the Free World”, have responded so poorly to disaster vic-
tims on its own soil? The victims were virtually surrounded
by the resources they needed.
Two comments made by Congressman Tom Davis at a US
Congressional Select Committee Hearing on Hurricane Kat-
rina are very instructive, especially in light of the above:
“[Hurricane exercise] Pam was so very prescient. And
yet Katrina highlighted many, many weaknesses that either
were not anticipated by Pam, or were lessons learned but not
heeded.” (emphasis mine)
“That’s probably the most painful thing about Katrina and
the tragic loss of life: the foreseeability of it all.” (emphasis
mine)
Hurricane Katrina is truly a teachable moment. It can help
a society to understand its strengths and weaknesses in the
face of an emergency situation. If one of the richest countries
on earth cannot prepare for or cope with the impacts of a rel-
atively weak tropical storm system, one that had been well
forecast two-and-a-half days in advance of landfall, what
hope might there be for countries whose technological and
financial resources are much more limited? Hurricane Ka-
trina also serves to expose not only political and economic
differences among social groups in America but also serves
to expose racial issues as well. Meanwhile, the scientific
community in the United States is divided about the extent
to which global warming fueled Hurricane Katrina, the in-
tensity of which had been linked to high sea surface temper-
atures in the Gulf of Mexico.
A Pew Foundation editorial (2005) entitled “Was Katrina’s
power a product of global warming?” made the following
observation:
“But can science tell us whether Katrina’s destructiveness
was related to global warming? Not directly: science, as a
method, is not good at assigning causation for uncontrolled
events, and no single weather event can be linked directly to
a long-term driver, such as global warming. This inability to
draw a definite conclusion, however, in no sense justifies the
conclusion that global warming did not influence Katrina.”
As of today, a year and a half after Hurricane Katrina, the
issue still remains of who should have been the first respon-
der to the needs of the victims. Finger-pointing continues.
While there is enough blame to go around, it is clear (in ret-
rospect) that FEMA’s director was incapable of handling a
disaster of any magnitude, let alone that of Katrina’s. As a
political crony (a college friend of President Bush), he came
to the office with zero experience in dealing with natural or
manmade hazards. After having publicly praised the FEMA
director for doing a “heck of a job” a few days after Katrina,
an embarrassed President Bush had to release Brown from
the agency (CNN, 2005).
As noted throughout, the forecast of Katrina was nearly
perfect and was available 60 h – 2 1/2 days – before landfall.
There have been several news stories about the success of that
forecast. However, no one that I know of has taken credit
for coping with the impacts of the disaster that followed in
the wake of Katrina. This brings to mind a famous quote
attributed to President John F. Kennedy with regard to the
failure of the Bay of Pigs in the early 1960s: “Success has
many fathers. Failure is an orphan.” I have written a variation
of Kennedy’s quote that applies to the impacts of Katrina:
“The forecast of Katrina has many fathers. The impacts of
Katrina are orphans.” Of one thing we can be sure: there
will never be another hurricane named Katrina. Hurricane
forecasters retire the names of deadly hurricanes, never to be
used again.
As a final comment, all low-lying coastal urban areas
should pay attention to the lessons of Katrina, because they
too are at risk to coastal storms. As global warming contin-
ues throughout the 21st century, sea level will rise and storm
surges will move further inland. Tropical storms (typhoons,
cyclones, hurricanes) are expected to become more intense
and therefore more damaging, if not more frequent. Mega-
cities on the coast must become proactive in the face of the
changing global climate.
Lester Brown (2006) made the following observation:
Those of us who track the effects of global warming had
assumed that the first large flow of climate refugees would
likely be in the South Pacific with the abandonment of Tuvalu
or other low-lying islands. We were wrong. The first massive
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movement of climate refugees has been that of people away
from the Gulf Coast of the United States.
There is a general tendency to move past the last disaster
with the optimistic hope of being better prepared to cope with
future ones. With regard to the Katrina experience, though,
Americans as well as people in other megacities on the coast
must take the time to understand and truly learn from this
disaster. Megacities beware, in particular all those in low-
lying coastal areas around the globe.
Edited by: P. Lagos
Reviewed by: J. R. Logan and P. Fabian
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